STATEMENT OF

VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH A. SESTAK, JR.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS (N6/N7)

BEFORE THE

SEAPower SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2006 MARINE CORPS PROGRAMS AND SEABASING

APRIL 19, 2005
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2006 Seabasing programs.

The current and future security environments have become increasingly challenging to U.S. and allied interests because of regional security issues, the concern with terrorism globally, the expanded influence of non-state actors and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the U.S. security strategy for the 21st Century evolves, our nation remains committed to its global responsibilities to ensure national security through peace, prosperity and freedom. However, U.S. options to extend global influence through forward basing of military capability are diminishing. Potential enemies may be likely to strike US bases abroad in a conflict with increasingly lethal weapons, including WMD that are either developed by indigenous industries or purchased abroad. Many nations may find it politically untenable to host US bases or allow access through their territory. The strategic challenge for our national and military leaders will be to maintain a global presence for security in the face of decreasing access overseas.

Sea Power 21

The objective of Sea Power 21 is to ensure that our nation possesses credible combat capability on scene to promote regional stability, to deter aggression throughout the world, to assure access of joint forces and to fight and win should deterrence fail. Sea Power 21 guides the Navy’s transformation from a threat-based platform centric structure to a capabilities-based, fully integrated force. The pillars of Sea Power 21 -- Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Base -- are integrated by FORCEnet, the means by which the power of sensors, networks, weapons, warriors and platforms are harnessed in a networked combat force. It is this networked force that will provide the access with the strategic agility and persistence necessary to prevail in the continuing war on terror, as well as the speed and overwhelming power to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any regional peer competitor in combat operations.

The Navy of the future must be capabilities-based and threat-oriented. While the fabric of our fighting force will still be the power and speed needed to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any regional threat, FORCEnet’s pervasive awareness (C4ISR) will be more important than mass. And because of its access from the sea, the Navy and Marine Corps are focusing significant effort and analysis in support of joint combat power projection by leveraging this traditional access provided by the oceans through Seabasing, with the access now provided by space and cyberspace through FORCEnet. It is the synergistic access provided by these great “commons” -- the sea and space and cyberspace -- that is the revolution of the future.

To this end, the technological innovations and human-systems integration advances in future platforms remain critical. Our future warships will sustain operations in forward areas longer, be able to respond more quickly to emerging contingencies, and generate more sorties and simultaneous attacks against greater numbers of multiple aim points and targets with greater effect than our current fleet. However, the future is about the capabilities posture of this fleet, which is why the future is also about establishing C4ISR as a warfighting weapon and integrator from the sea... and understanding the impact of changing C4ISR investment strategies on the warfight, in particular as it enhances our ability to project power from the seabase.
Seabasing Vision

Today’s U.S. strategic guidance requires secure strategic access and the freedom to act globally. However, during periods of crisis, Combatant Commanders will need the capability to contain the crisis by deterring potential adversaries or seizing the initiative to swiftly defeat enemy actions. Given the likely operational environment, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must be able to project power when forward basing may not be available. Even where forward bases are otherwise available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally restricted for military use, and the JFC may desire to reduce the footprint and visibility of the joint force. Where potential air, sea, and land entry points are available, their predictability may allow the enemy to focus his anti-access capabilities against our forces. In addition, they may be a source of friction in some coalition situations and present security challenges that theater operational objectives.

**Seabasing** is one of several evolving Joint Integrating Concepts that will be a critical capability for joint forces in 2015-2025 that significantly increases options while decreasing liabilities, both militarily politically. Projecting and sustaining joint combat power from the seas, Seabasing assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces operating globally. Seabasing capitalizes on the maritime dominance gained by our nation’s forces, and uses the maneuver space and freedom of action afforded by the sea, space and cyberspace to project and sustain joint combat power from an inherently mobile aggregation of distributed and networked platforms. There are seven overarching principles that are essential to applying the Seabasing concept across a wide range of scenarios:

- **Use the sea as maneuver space.** Seabasing exploits the freedom of the high seas to conduct operational maneuver in the maritime (to include littoral) environment relatively unconstrained by political and diplomatic restrictions, for rapid deployment and immediate employment. Sea based operations provide JFCs with an operational flexibility to support the immediate deployment/employment/sustainment of forces across the extended depth and breadth of the battlespace.

- **Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence.** Joint forces operating from the sea base, in conjunction with other globally based joint forces, provide the JFC an on-scene, unconstrained, credible offensive and defensive capability during the early stages of a crisis. Combined with other elements of this joint interdependent force, forward deployed joint forces can help to deter or preclude a crisis or enable the subsequent introduction of additional forces, equipment, and sustainment.

- **Protect joint force operations.** Seabasing provides a large measure of inherent force protection derived from its freedom of operational maneuver in a maritime environment. The combined capabilities of joint platforms in multiple mediums (surface, sub-surface, and air) provide the joint forces a defensive shield both at sea and ashore. The integration of these capabilities and freedom of maneuver effectively degrades the enemy’s ability to successfully target and engage friendly forces while facilitating joint force deployment, employment, and sustainment.
• **Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.** Forces rapidly closing the sea base by multi-dimensional means (air, surface, and subsurface) give the JFC the ability to rapidly scale and tailor forces/capabilities to the mission. Seabasing provides an option to the JFC to mass, disperse, or project joint combat power throughout the battlespace at the desired time to influence, deter, contain, or defeat an adversary.

• **Sustain joint force operations from the sea.** Sea based logistics entails sustaining forces through an increasingly anticipatory and responsive logistics system to support forces afloat and select joint/multinational forces operating ashore. The sea base is sustained through the interface with support bases and strategic logistics pipelines enabling joint forces to remain on station, where needed, for extended periods of time. Seabasing uses selective off-load to assemble and deliver tailored sustainment packages directly to joint forces operating ashore.

• **Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases.** Seabasing integrates global power projection capabilities with sea based power projection capabilities to provide the JFC with multiple access options to complement forward basing in the Joint Operating Area (JOA), and reducing reliance on forward basing if the security environment dictates. This includes theater access capabilities at improved and unimproved ports and airfields.

• **Create uncertainty for our adversaries.** Seabasing places an adversary in a dilemma through the conduct of dispersed and distributed operations. The options of multiple points and means of entry require an adversary to either disperse or concentrate his forces, creating opportunities to exploit seams and gaps in his defenses.

These seven overarching principles guide the development of the Seabasing Concept and address how Seabasing will be employed by the future Joint Force. Seabasing is the capability to shape a strategic environment, to be rapidly employed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and to win decisively in a major conflict -- using the world’s greatest maneuver area, the seas, to project its power.

### Seabasing Operational Principles

In order to deliver credible combat power across the full spectrum of potential future military operations, the Seabasing Vision must be operationalized. This requires tying together the right Joint capabilities, in the right manner, to pursue operational and tactical objectives contributing to overall strategic goals. Seabasing allows the JFC to do this with minimum, or without, reliance on forward airfields or ports, providing tremendous operational flexibility. The key operational principles that make Seabasing a national asset to pursue national goals are laid out below:

• **Military Access.** Joint forces need to be able to flow into and out of a theater of operations as the operational tempo requires and the threat dictates. Among the other strike groups, our forward deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) with their supporting surface combatants and submarines provide a robust capability to ensure access from the Sea Base in non-permissive environments. Assured access in a theater of operations is key not only for naval forces, but for the Joint Force, and Seabasing acts as a Joint portal through which a Joint Combat Force can assemble the appropriate mix...
of capabilities required to ensure missions success at a time and place of its choosing. It is important to note that this access is not just from the seas, but it is also gaining access to information and intelligence through surveillance and reconnaissance, preparing the battlespace with credible combat power to shape -- that is, deter or dissuade -- an adversary from acting against U.S. or allied interests. These attributes define Seabasing as a true national capability.

- **Distributed.** Seabasing will take advantage of the global commons -- the sea, space and cyberspace -- to expand our dominance throughout the battlespace. The JFC will be able to mass effects, rather than forces, keeping open alternate avenues of approach and forcing adversaries to remain off balance. With deep operational reach, we will be able to mask our intentions and rapidly apply combat power to either interdict terrorists without warning, or to preempt enemy action. Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Multi-mission Aircraft (MMA) patrol aircraft, Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) intelligence aircraft, JSF operating from the follow-on large-deck amphibious assault ship (LHA(R)), and Advanced (E-2C) Hawkeye (AHE) operating from CSGs all provide the critical ISR and command and control necessary to rapidly survey this massive and distributed battlespace so forces can react quickly and decisively when required.

- **Netted.** In order to be distributed, we must be netted; netted in the combat forces’ pervasive awareness of the battlespace; in their ability to communicate across that battlespace; and netted in the control of forces and effects throughout the battlespace. This is a Joint net where, for example, USAF global strike aircraft can seamlessly flow into and out of the battlespace; this is a Joint net where Army Styker Brigades can call for supporting fires from DD(X) long range advanced gun systems (AGS), or USMC Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) flying from LHA(R). The rationale to close the well deck on LHA(R) and increase its aviation strike capability was central to delivering a more lethal force and increasing the nodes within the Joint combat network. Additionally, this joint net will be enhanced as Special Operations Forces are inserted by cruise missile-equipped submarines (SSGNs), and then call for strikes conducted covertly by SSNs and SSGNs with Tactical TOMAHAWK (TACTOM) land attack missiles. FORCEnet, with its constellation of Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) and Tactical Satellite (TSAT) space platforms, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) radios, and tactical data links will be key enablers for coordinating distributed operations in a netted environment.

- **Greater Operational Availability.** The ability to rapidly assemble seabasing requirements with robust capabilities is inextricably linked with Operational Availability and the sustainment of our Joint forces. Seabasing is enhanced and enabled by improving our force posture and having the right forces forward at the right time -- presence with purpose. This includes aggressively using our Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF), Sea Swapping crews with our deployed ships and maintaining the readiness required to quickly surge naval forces in accordance with Fleet Response Plan (FRP) policies. Operational availability is also enhanced by the Maritime Preposition Force (Future) (MPF(F)) ships, which rapidly bring at sea arrival and assembly of significant ground combat power. This is ground combat power that can be used for Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), in stability operations, GWOT missions, or in support of humanitarian operations seen in Operation Unified Assistance (the tsunami relief efforts). MPF(F) delivers the JFC the capability to conduct
rapid and decisive combat operations across a wide spectrum of challenging national objectives.

- **Joint Transformation.** As Seabasing matures and grows in its sophistication in Joint operations, it will further enhance transformation for the other Services. The Army and Air Force will rely on Seabasing when they consider combat lift, force employment, and sustainment and force protection. This serves as the foundation for capabilities-based, threat-oriented force planning -- not platform or Service-centric planning. The JFC will be able to consider flowing U.S. Army distributed maneuver forces and their logistics through the Sea Base, utilizing the Theater Support Vessels (TSVs) and High-Speed Vessels (HSVs). These transformational platforms, coupled with the robust Sea Shield that Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the surface combatant force (DDGs, DD(X), CG(X)) and the CSG air wing, exploit the advantages of speed and maneuver. The projection of Sea Shield will not only exist at sea, but deep overland. Overland defense will be further enhanced by Naval and Air Force offensive counter-air (OCA) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD). Along with Air Force strategic tanking, Joint Forces from the sea will have persistence and reach unparalleled in past combat operations.

- **Capabilities Based…Threat Oriented.** As the operational principles above demonstrate, Seabasing will cause JFCs and their planners to focus on capabilities, not platforms. They will plan and conduct parallel operations from vastly different operational approaches. They will synchronize across a massive battlespace with increased precision and lethality. They will think in terms of theater-wide force protection and sustainment. The overall impact is that Seabasing will drive transformation; a transformation that delivers the combat power tailored for the threat, rather than just what is available.

The future security environment and battlespace will be complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and volatile. Seabasing offers the JFC strategic options he has not had in the past due to uncertain access and basing rights. Our robust military capabilities can be assembled and poised for action without being subject to the constraints and restraints often imposed in the past by neutral and allied nations alike. When the security situation requires American commitment and presence, whether to ensure the free flow of commerce, to strengthen diplomatic actions, or to demonstrate political will, Seabasing -- characterized by the principles above -- provides the Nation the capability to assemble the Joint forces needed to attain the desired end state.

**Sea Base Concept of Operations - the Maritime Prepositioning Ship of the future MPF(F)**

Our Sea Base Concept of Operations is a *Global Concept of Operations* which employs a flexible force posture that includes Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs), surface and submarine strike groups, and logistics groups, among others. These strike and support groups are capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict simultaneously around the world. From the period prior to the onset of a crisis through the completion of stabilization operations, Joint Seabasing provides scalable power projection options to the Joint Force Commander. These capabilities provide a framework for the range of employment options available to the JFC through Joint Seabasing. With regard to forcible entry and the employment of MPF(F) in the future, the five tenants of Seabasing are:
a. **Close** – rapid closure of joint force capabilities from within, or to, an area of crisis. This force, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) deploys from the United States to the MPF(F) via two principal means – high-speed sealift and strategic airlift. Strategic airlift is used to fly the Marines to a forward base to embark MPF(F) and marry up with their heavy equipment. Sealift is used to close non-self deploying aircraft, such as CH-53, and its support equipment directly to the Sea Base. The MPF(F) with its embarked Marines join up with the high-speed sealift and non-self-deploying aircraft at the Sea Base, as it is underway for rapid assembly, saving time for closure to the theater.

b. **Assemble** – seamless integration of scalable joint force capabilities on and around secure sea based assets. The critical capability of the future prepositioning force will be selective offload, which will require a “warehouse at sea”, with “just in time logistics.” This movement of combat and combat support equipment will be executed when required by the Commander, at sea, vice waiting for its assembly at an advanced base ashore or within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). This new capability will dramatically alter the way future forces are employed, and improve their security while they are being assembled for combat. These assembly methods will be executed quickly and in high sea states, with reduced manpower. These methods involve advanced technologies that include:
   i. External cargo transfer and movement, including the use of sophisticated modern crane technologies
   ii. Internal cargo movement, using modern state-of-the art commercial warehousing techniques, adapted for use at sea
   iii. Inter-Modal Packaging systems that support efficient and largely automated external and internal cargo movement
   iv. Creative use of internal volume (Internal Broken Stow factor) creating the required space for selective cargo breakdown, movement, and assembly

Under a robust and properly assembled Sea Shield, assembly for combat will be conducted quickly and without the vulnerabilities associated with assembly at fixed ports and airfields. This transformational capability supports the critical at-sea arrival and sustainment timelines required in future potential major conflict operations. MPF(F) is also uniquely suited to respond on short notice to provide additional combat power in support of the Global War on Terror.

c. **Employ** – flexible employment and insertion of scalable joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported from the sea base. Integrated power projection includes not only the use of all-weather precision strike throughout the JOA, but also the insertion of ground forces at key objectives selected by the JFC. In order to do so, we will use a mix of vertical and surface assault:
   i. Vertical maneuver with rotary-wing platforms (e.g., MV-22 and CH-53) from the MPF(F) expands the options for the JFC. Coupled with JSF from LHA(R) to increase airborne fires, this vertical insertion
enables the JFC to employ combat forces deep into austere environments with increased lethality, mobility and survivability.

ii. Simultaneous surface maneuver with the enhanced Landing Craft, Air-Cushion (LCAC(X)) for forcible entry operations from the sea provides additional options for the JFC and supports heavy combat payloads.

The Sea Base must also possess the requisite capabilities to exercise command, control, computer, communications and intelligence (C4I) functions to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander. It must also be able to “size up” to support a JFC or Combined (Coalition) Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander, potentially as a part of the MPF(F). These command elements will have the capability to exercise command from a forward command platform, using reach-back for support from ashore.

d. **Sustain** - persistent sustainment of selected joint forces afloat and ashore through transition to decisive combat operations ashore. An essential requirement within the distributed Sea Base is continual sustainment of joint force operations, including selected joint forces operating ashore. The force protection benefit of Seabasing will be to minimize or eliminate an operational pause caused by the buildup of a large lodgment ashore. Preventing this pause will reduce the footprint ashore and move the logistics “tail” to the sea base and within the protection provided by the Sea Shield. Additionally, the extent and degree with which the Sea Base can provide medical care at sea and rapidly move injuries to complex facilities outside the JOA will aid in improved casualty care and increased efficiencies as the Sea Base supports the theater commander in the future.

e. **Reconstitute** - the capability to rapidly recover, reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and around the maneuverable Sea Base for subsequent operations. As follow-on forces enter the JOA, or as the operational situation dictates, the JFC may rapidly transition joint sea-based forces to sequential or follow-on operations through at-sea reconstitution. Rapid reconstitution supports persistent combat operations by eliminating the need to wait for additional forces or new equipment from the United States to support additional operations in another theater of operations.

The bridge to Naval transformation is Seabasing, centered on its ability to project, sustain and defend decisive, flexible and credible Joint combat power ashore. Joint combat forces will operate from the Sea Base and the Navy is committed to MPF(F) as the centerpiece and key enabler of the Sea Base. These future Maritime Pre-positioning Ships will serve a broader operational and expeditionary function than current pre-positioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the at-sea assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives by high-speed airlift and sealift from the United States to the forward operating locations and directly to the MPF(F), itself. These ships will off-load forces, weapons and supplies selectively while remaining far over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground maneuver forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland; and
they will then sustain in-theater logistics, communications and medical capabilities for the joint force for extended periods, and then reconstitute (e.g. maneuver to another theater of operations) to be employed ashore, again, as needed.

SUMMARY
Seabasing is a transformational joint concept that exploits the United States’ control of the sea to provide a viable option for the military commander to project joint power. The Joint Sea Base provides the operational “freedom of maneuver” to conduct a full range of scalable military operations. The mission of our Navy remains maintaining “command of the sea” and projecting -- while protecting and sustaining -- sovereign combat power across the global commons. The increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing uncertainty of other nations’ ability or desire to ensure access in a future conflict, will continue to drive the need for Naval forces and the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the seas. The increased emphasis on the littorals and the global nature of the terrorist threat will demand the ability to apply effective and adequate combat power at the place and time of the Nation’s choosing. Seabasing and the application of its operational concept within the Sea Base is a catalyst for transformation -- across each service -- and as the key enabler within the maritime domain as a national capability for the U.S. military force.

We look forward to the future from a strong partnership with Congress that has brought the Navy and Marine Corps Team many successes today. We thank you for your consideration.