

**Chief of Naval Operations  
Adm. Jonathan Greenert**

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**Adm. Greenert:** Thank you, Dr. Hamre. You've been a great mentor for the service chiefs and many of the officials in the Department of Defense and it's really an honor and a privilege to know you and to learn from you.

I was taken by the CNO, 1A, the wind pipe and all that, and that's a new thought to me. What I see, I make a decision, okay, here's where we're going to go and then let the debate begin.

But it's a privilege also to be back here. What a beautiful room and what a beautiful sight at CSIS. I value the input that we receive here. I definitely look forward to your questions and answers.

The discussions today will certainly be about the rebalance, and I have to tell you, ladies and gentlemen, I sort of have a personal rebalance that's sort of in progress. A year ago I went to, just about exactly a year ago I went to Japan, Korea and Singapore for about eight or nine days, and typically a service chief will go out there maybe once a year. That's about right. But things have changed. In December I was in Indonesia for an International Sea Power Symposium. In February I was in Malaysia for the same reason. We were in China just in April in Qingdao for the Western Pacific Naval Symposium where we kind of brought together what's called the [QS], and we'll talk about that. And we leave this Saturday to go to Japan and Korea. We were in Pakistan and Norway last week so we're kind of balancing that rebalance, if you will, in our own right. And it isn't lost on me that the old saying still applies, every day you're out of Washington you lose a million bucks. So I have to keep that in mind.

But seriously, as Dr. Hamre said, it's about understanding and commitment and it does take personal leadership commitments. I'll be going to China again in July for what's called a counterpart visit with Admiral Wu. We host the International Sea Power Symposium. That will be all the chiefs of the navies, and we'll probably get about 100 of them. We're headed to Newport in September and we'll go to Australia and New Zealand in January.

I'm not here to give you my travelogue as much as to say look, this does take a lot of commitment and it takes people being there. It is a lot of face time by them as well as us.

So today I'd like to talk a little bit about our presence mandate, the Navy presence mandate. Some of you are familiar with this, it's a deliberate process that has to continue if we want to be effective. I'll update you on the Asia Pacific rebalance, and I think an emerging opportunity for what we can do, particularly with China.

Look, for us, we have to operate forward. We have to be where it matters when it matters so that we can influence events around the world. That puts your Navy in the fore, that's what you want

us to do, and that's what our national security folks want us to do. We provide forward presence to assure and build allies, to deter, and to respond. I won't put you through the soliloquy of events that starts in Syria, Libya, Sudan. It's the North Korean missile test a year ago, where we had to be where it mattered when it mattered. Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief.

We've got these great graphics here. I would have brought in even more slides if I'd known they were going to be this fancy. But I just have a few things to remind you of.

There are 289 ships in your Navy today, 104 are [underway]. By the way, that number, 104, is about the same amount we had deployed 20 years ago when we had over 400 ships. So we think we're being pretty efficient and we think that we are where it matters so that we can be effective when it matters.

For my boss and for me it's access to what I call the crossroads, these bowtie or valve markers depending on your proclivity for political science or engineering, but this is where we have to be for freedom of navigation without threat of [inaudible], for the security, that threat, continued access there. If you look at where the bowties are, it's not necessarily the most clean area of the world. There's piracy, it's the ring of fire, it's nations not necessarily friendly with us or with each other. So we have to be able to respond there.

The Asia Pacific rebalance, as we know, is a broad government effort. It's a U.S. government effort. And there's no real particular end state yet that I'm aware of or that we have been given that is declared. In other words, you say get me here and the rebalance is over. This is a continuing initiative that takes a deliberate presence. But I would tell you, I agree with Dr. Hamre, sea power is going to underwrite the Asia Pacific rebalance.

Now we're a Pacific nation. We're tied to geography to the Pacific. We're tied to trade, we're tied to allies. Robert Kaplan's got a series of books recently, *The Revenge of Geography*, that's the most recent, *Asia Cauldron*, which clearly lays out those connections and why they're so important to the United States and why the United States is so important to the Pacific. We have been there, we the Navy, for seven decades and we've had continuing presence, not that much different from those 51 ships you see there in the Asia Pacific over those seven decades.

I would tell you, ladies and gentlemen, my observation, having like I said kind of rebalanced myself over there and talked with leadership, with my associates, if you will, my peers, that our leadership may turn to us for leadership, they turn to us and say okay, where are we headed? What do you guys want to do? And it continues that way. We do get questions, but it's leadership, what they would like from us.

So the rebalance is underway but as I said, it's a work in progress. Give me the next one. I just have a few graphics so I want to work with this one.

For us, to rebalance, we're going to have to build first on our creating allies. We have to commit to and strengthen the alliances that you see out there today. These are the key and critical ones right here. We have a treaty with these folks. We have a deliberate and well spelled out alliance. That's a key advantage in almost every challenge that we face. There is clarity of purpose and

clarity of response. Yeah, there are questions, what does this really mean? And we can get to that and that is maybe debatable and it may be situational, but it is unique in that it spells out very clearly what the commitment of the U.S. is.

We will strengthen those ties, and that's part of our rebalance. The recent agreement in the Philippines is an example, and the potential changes, security changes in Japan, are examples of again strengthening and clarifying those ties.

For us, it's step one, information sharing. Integrating our operations, training together, foreign military sales that are relevant and useful for the alliance, and it's international military education and training. We are doing innovative ship and air employment concepts as we work with these allies up there. Some are kinetic and some are non-kinetic. What do I mean by non-kinetic? Humanitarian assistance, how to do it better, how to do it more effective and how to do it faster because it's all about time when you come to those operations.

The Republic of Korea and Japan represent really, in my opinion, the most critical of those alliances. They are the more modern military. We have mature O plans and campaign plans with them, and we have an evolving -- we're building military relations. The President recently I think made that very clear and underlined the significance of what I just said.

The Republic of Korea, Japan and U.S. trilateral cooperation is something that we are pursuing aggressively. We have been able to get some done with our navies and that's been good, but I think that brings us a quantum capability in opportunities like ballistic missile defense or anti-submarine warfare. We can [net] and bring together our respective individual capabilities there. But we'll be vigilant, we in the Navy, for future opportunities in these alliances. And I think you understand, that security becomes the issue, [inaudible] the security of today and the history that evolves and seems to interrupt our ability to bring things like trilateral operations together.

Our stalwart ally is Japan and in my opinion pretty much the key to security in Northeast Asia. We welcome better integration with them. They are a treaty ally, as I said before, but it's not like we haven't exercised with them before. Give me a picture here. Here we are with our Stockdale destroyer, our Gridley destroyer and with the Kurama during what we call a passing exercise. We do this all the time and we do much more comprehensive operations. Maybe you say I knew that, but a lot of people don't know that. It goes on all the time with Japan.

But we've also integrated with the carrier strike group, give me the next one. That's the George Washington and that's her strike group along with some Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force operating together.

So in the future we may have that opportunity with collective self defense, if that comes together, to integrate like our NATO allies, to integrate with carrier strike group deployments like our NATO allies. I think it's an opportunity we ought to think about.

Let's go back to the rebalance slide, if you will.

I just talked about our deliberate [inaudible], our treaties. But we've got partnerships in other areas that we need to continue to build. Some may be a little more ad hoc and some are more enduring. Singapore, Indonesia, it's evolving quickly ladies and gentlemen. We are being offered an opportunity with Indonesia that I never thought I would see, and it's much more than just port visits. It's operating together. It's sites in Malaysia to operate our P-3s and our P-8s out of that are coming through. Brunei, obviously Australia, obviously New Zealand. I should say not as obviously New Zealand, but it's emerging and you can see it here when we do RIMPAC. But this is an opportunity here that we need to continue to build on and understand how do we come together quickly and perhaps in an ad hoc manner or for specific [inaudible] as opposed to a treaty.

Next is I think a strategic partnership, an opportunity there with India. That's emerging. The leadership with India. I just said I was in Pakistan last week, and the opportunity to actually challenge the Prime Minister. I said Mr. Prime Minister, and he's just come back from Iran. It was interesting. I said so what's kind of on your mind here when you think security? And he said the opportunity with India, the opportunity to build confidence building measures so that we can get a better understanding of our security situation there. We feel that that would then bring on opportunities in the Indian Ocean writ large, and obviously we're very interested in that.

So stable mil to mil relations there, they've been there. We need it to improve our communications and our interoperability.

Currently we do exercise with the Indian Navy. It's a lot of humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, medical, but my goal would be to get back to where we were in the mid 2000's. We were doing very very comprehensive events in an exercise called Malabar which is an annual exercise we have with the Indian Navy. We were doing carrier operations together. It's very very complex. Integrating air wings. And I think it would be great if we could get back to that.

Next is building a constructive relationship with the People's Republic of China. I hosted my counterpart last September here in the United States, San Diego, Newport Naval Academy, and of course here in Washington, DC. I mentioned that we met in Qingdao. We would be the Western Pacific, in fact all of the nations around the Pacific, Chile was there, Peru was there, there were a host of nations, Canada, et cetera. We put together, you're all familiar with it, the Conduct in Unexpected Encounters at Sea.

Now I also had a counterpart visit that I mentioned here in July. The Secretary of Defense was just in China. So it's continuing, the deliberate [inaudible] of working together and building a constructive relationship. Military to military exercises are the best talking good exercise and is better and maybe best. We have RIMPAC coming up, Rim of the Pacific. A comprehensive exercise. And Admiral Wu and I agree on what we call the kind of eight initiatives, eight areas where we feel we can improve operations and understanding with our two navies. It runs the gamut of midshipmen exchanges to mid-grade officer exchanges, to medical officer exchanges, to swapping officers from the Peace Ark to the Mercy to RIMPAC and it goes on and on. A host of exercises that when a Chinese ship and a U.S. ship are in the same place at the same time such as the Gulf of Aden, they can do an exercise. Imagine that, a module exercise that they can do

without having to run each other's chain of command and get to the Minister of Defense level. We'd like to get to that.

The exercises that China will conduct when they come to RIMPAC are reasonably comprehensive. We are limited by the National Defense Authorization Act limitations, I think it was in 2000, we've worked through those. We've briefed the Congress on that. So I feel pretty good about where we're heading with RIMPAC.

So for us the rebalance, I'll kind of characterize it, the rebalance to the Pacific, three areas. Forces, capabilities and understanding.

For forces, we send our most modern, and we have, and our most ready to the Asia Pacific. We've increased the allied ship presence there from 58 next year, you saw 51 this year, to 67 in 2020. That's our goal. There will be ramifications through budgetary issues, that's fine. We'll do our best. But the fact is ladies and gentlemen, it will go up, it will go up over what it is today. It will be things like another SSN to Guam next year. That will be four SSNs at Guam. Two ballistic missile defense capable destroyers in Japan. And four littoral combat ships eventually in Singapore by FY17.

We have a ship called a joint high speed vessel which will deploy shortly here to the Western Pacific, next year. It will forward station. We'll rotate crews here. We'll have a mobile landing platform which is terrific for theater security cooperation, to be used for that and for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In fact we have two of them. There happens to be one coming into port, you can see that at the top. But right here, you can bring [landing air cushions] right in there in these sort of little garage-like things, if you will, and unload and load them from there. And this thing, when it's done, [inaudible]. Imagine if we'd had that in the Philippines, how much humanitarian assistance we could deliver. That's all part of the future.

The P8 is on its first deployment. In fact we're going to have a change of command soon with that ship, with that squadron. We are almost done with its first deployment. It made a huge contribution to the Malaysian Airline search that took place.

Tactical air, we have the Growler which is our latest and best electronic attack aircraft. Our F-35C, our Joint Strike Fighter, about the end of this decade will deploy to the Western Pacific and that will be its first deployment. And then Tritan, which is a Global Hawk looking thing, which is very good at maritime search, if you will, it will deploy in '17 to Okinawa. That's forces.

Capabilities. We invest in the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific missions are our benchmark for how we build our budget and where we're going with our capabilities. We close what we call kill chain gaps, and that's getting from the sensor to the weapon to the follow up to make sure that things work properly. It's about disrupting an adversary's command and control and C4I in addition to having kinetic features. So I'm talking about electromagnetic warfare. I'm talking about cyber.

We have cyber mission teams which are [inaudible]. We have IOC [inaudible] if you will. Their goal is to access, to exploit and to provide effects in the cyber domain under the attributes and the authorities that we have.

We have [netted] warfare which are benchmarked to the Western Pacific, and that's netting a ship, an aircraft, an undersea vehicle or a submarine together to be able to deliver common effects, [read] missiles.

Unmanned underwater vehicles. That will be our first deployment. I just showed you some of the ships that will be there, the mobile landing platform, the high speed vessel. We will bring lasers eventually to the Western Pacific. We're going to demonstrate it this summer in the Arabian Gulf, but our first deployment on a ship will be to the Western Pacific, and of course rail gun. Rachel may have a picture of the rail gun, show you what it's going to look like. But in '16 we will demonstrate this here, we'll demonstrate it probably off the U.S., to see how this thing works so that by the end of the decade we'll have that.

Capabilities. And then lastly, understanding.

I talked to you about relations and travel and getting together and cutting deals, but frankly, ladies and gentlemen, the rebalance will succeed through relationships, in my opinion, not just forces. Forces is great, but if you all aren't working together, it's not going to [inaudible].

We have to work on our [inaudible] today. [Inaudible] commanding officers will say what's going to happen in 2020, 2021? Well [inaudible] driving the ships, [inaudible]. So I have to give kudos to the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. They have two programs, bringing the best and the brightest kids together for personnel exchanges. They have a thing called the Short Term Exchange Program. We contribute to it. The Chinese Navy contributes to it. We send junior officers to ride Japanese ships and do lectures and seminars and understand what makes us tick in the various navies, to understand, get on the bridge of the ship, get on the bridge of a Chinese ship if we can do that, but certainly a Japanese ship. Malaysia is in, Indonesia is thinking about it. We're in. And say hey look, when you encounter, here's what it's like. Here's the [inaudible]. This is a must, coming from a different country and a different culture, but we've got to work together out here in a common domain. So they have a rider program which we'd like to continue to work on.

Working together before the crisis, building the trust, the interoperability and the relationship so that when you have a huge typhoon like the one that took place last year, we can bring that international cooperation together in days, not in a week or two. We can get moving on that. And of course we saw it in spades on the Malaysian airline search where the ability to operate together was key.

For us, there are 700 training events, 170 exercises each year in the Asia Pacific region. Again, I kind of allude to what Dr. Hamre said at the very beginning. We're working this and we'll continue to work it hard.

Last few words, and then we'll move over to a conversation.

It's about opportunity here in the future, and I mentioned some of them, but working with China. We've got a pretty good opportunity coming together in just mil to mil operations. They are active, they are capable, and they are professional blue water navy. They were there for the Malaysian airline search. Many of their people were on board. And they did a lot in that regard. They do counter-terrorism patrols, they do counter-piracy patrols. And we will continue that engagement with them because it's about preventing misunderstanding and miscalculation.

I'm not [inaudible] shaping a rising Navy that can be great and will be great and it also has to be responsible and a leader in a very very important area. To embrace international norms and laws, collaborate. That's the key.

We founded the Western Pacific Naval Symposium where we signed a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, that was important but it's just the beginning. It's not a binding document, but we all agree that we would, it's not legally binding, but we agree we, the chiefs, we all if you will stacked hands on this and Admiral Wu told me himself that he put the training plan together and they intend to comply.

So we get together in Newport in September, we, the chiefs of navy, will update. So how are we doing on this? Are you in? Are you in? Are you in? What have you done? And we'll continue to do that at each of these symposia. This is the agreement we have.

We want to take it outside in the Western Pacific and not make it just conduct for only the Western Pacific. This can be good for conduct in the Indian Ocean. It would be great for conduct in the Arabian Gulf and everywhere else. That's our endeavor, if you will, as the league of chiefs. I just made that up now, so -- The league of navy chiefs.

A little bit about RIMPAC. Twenty-three nations, that's one more than the biggest before. So we're up to 147 ships, 6 submarines, 200 aircraft, 25,000 people all told. And of course China will participate. But Norway's participating. There are a lot of different nations participating all the way out there to the Hawaiian op areas. We'll obviously build relationships. It's about trust and interoperability and the exercises will run from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief. The Peace Ark will be there, the Mercy will be there, we'll have littoral combat ships in Hawaii and San Diego doing counter-mine in San Diego then off to Hawaii. The P8 will be there. We'll have our Growler and we'll also have the F-22. So a lot of our modern platforms together doing integrated operations.

Let me close with a few things. The Asia Pacific region is home to our stalwart allies and U.S. interests. There are fiscal realities that are going to affect it, but that's going to result in us depending more on each other. But our focus is to strengthen relationship and improve the interoperability. Work hard in the Asia Pacific rebalance. I don't have a specific end state in mind, but we're on a good course and a good speed. I like it. I like where our forces are headed, the capabilities, the understanding. We've got to be able to adapt and seize the initiative when it presents itself. We're going to have to lead.

So I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much for listening to my remarks.

**Moderator:** Admiral, thank you. I'm Mike Green, [inaudible] Eurasia here at CSIS. It's great to have you back in our new building. Part of our rebalance.

The first Navy ship went to the Pacific 200 years ago, the USS Essex. [Inaudible] almost all the [British] shipping in the Pacific. And Captain [Ford] came back and told the Secretary of the Navy, we've got to pay more attention to the Pacific, and I expect that the Navy blew him off, but in a later century Theodore Roosevelt [inaudible]. As I understand the rebalance the White House [inaudible] Navy [inaudible].

All of us who work on Asia, the Pacific, appreciate your leadership and especially your coming today.

I'll ask you a couple of questions and then we'll turn it over to the audience.

This relationship with China is hard to follow. On one hand we have a really significant agreement, the Unexpected Encounters at Sea, and China's in RIMPAC now for the first time. On the other hand, there are reports out of Beijing where Chinese [inaudible] saying of course [inaudible] doesn't apply to the East China Sea. The South China Sea, the part where [inaudible] really matter. Then you have this continuing pressure all along the [inaudible] Vietnam. So it's sort of [inaudible].

Did you feel like the [inaudible] confidence building is shaping or affecting in any way the operations we're seeing? Or is this going to be a long term effort?

**Adm. Greenert:** It's going to be a long term effort. We are seeing results, I can't say [inaudible]. We just signed the document and we're working all that now. And I'll get to the comments. But what we are seeing today are Chinese commanding officers, Chinese warships, on the agreement that we made, Admiral Wu and myself back in September, they [address] each other and that wasn't the case before, it wasn't required that they do that. They are polite and courteous. They have had situations where they have intervened on our behalf when one of our ships was being approached by a non-Navy Chinese ship and being kind of harassed. The commanding officer of the warship said you know, I've spoken with the guys and [inaudible] and have them get out of the way, and actually positioned itself. So there are a few examples of this.

So Mike, I'm not saying oh man, we've got this [inaudible]. We are starting to see [inaudible]. We have got to manage our way through this, in my opinion, through this East China Sea and South China Sea. We're not leaving. They know that. They would be the leadership of the Chinese Navy. So we figured out, we believe -- I shouldn't say we figured out. We believe that we can manage our way through this.

The statement that was attributed, and I see this over and over, I think he might have meant this is not legally binding. We know that. And the question becomes but are you going to comply? We did both. So therefore we have got to continue, I think, to reengage and say where are you on this, where is the tangible results and let's see your [inaudible]. We're working on that. We

have our procedures in place. They're on the bridges of our ships and we will share them with the requisite members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. They say they will do the same, but Mike, we have to work it through.

**Moderator:** Do you worry about the kind of two tier system evolving where the POA and [inaudible] Navy are becoming more [inaudible] with us but not [inaudible] Vietnam. [Inaudible] to some extent, [inaudible].

**Adm. Greenert:** Good point. But Japan was a signator, China was a signator, Korea is a signator. You get my point. Vietnam was a signator. It was unanimous. One country abstained; I don't know who it was. We all put our vote in a basket. So my point would be we'll just have to see. But everybody said they would comply.

I would say it is worth, I won't say worrying about per se, but it's worth being deliberate and vigilant to see everybody is complying. Why can't we all address these [inaudible], especially in [inaudible].

**Moderator:** It's a good solid strategy because it makes this a regional issue not a bilateral issue.

**Adm. Greenert:** It's a global issue. I think we need to export this, in my opinion. I'd love to see this in the Strait of Hormuz.

**Moderator:** It would be a good thing [inaudible] actually have our Chinese friends, ourselves, our allies going out to [inaudible] saying [inaudible] as a team.

You were here in our older [wing] with General [Ray Shorts] and [inaudible] hosted you and talked about AirSea Battle. And our take-away was this is not a strategy, [inaudible] technological and operational. It's not grand strategy per se, it's some technological things we can and should do.

But if you look at the vulnerability of our forward presence, our forward bases, which isn't [getting easier], do you think we're at the cusp of needing a new strategy? I'm thinking [inaudible] Japanese, we had a war plan [inaudible]. The Navy had a maritime strategy with the Soviets. Are we getting to the point where we need to really rethink how we move forward and posture forward presence strategy? Or are you getting at a lot of the specific technological and alliance cooperative endeavors you described?

**Adm. Greenert:** Strategy wise we are, I've had my guys working on it, a refresh, what we named the cooperative strategy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. So that would be naval strategy and that's worldwide. That's sea services, so the Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Navy.

But with regard to the Western Pacific, Admiral Locklear has redone the campaign out there. They are addressing things that you described. Hardening of bases, [inaudible]. Where do I need presence? How is that evolving? [Inaudible] the South China Sea. What are the forces that I need? It goes across the board, looking at a very comprehensive [inaudible]. It's classified. But they called it Operation [inaudible]. I looked at that, I saw that and then I'm

reading in more detail about [inaudible]. It's a good plan to start out with but they've got lots of diversion there. In a similar manner, as we look at each area of the world, we have some reasonably mature plans but they need to be upgraded and your point is well taken. It's very difficult to write something that covers the world when it's such a different situation in the Arabian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific sometimes.

**Moderator:** [Inaudible] was a good plan for the Navy. It had one problem. It left the Army [inaudible], [inaudible] can't do that anymore.

A lot of what you're running through squares or some of the recommendations, [inaudible] CSIS when we did [inaudible]. These think tank recommendations are never original. We [inaudible]. Undersea warfare, [inaudible]. The one in here which [inaudible] reported at [inaudible], we said we needed another amphibious ready group [inaudible]. The Marines moving out of Okinawa to Guam, Australia. [Inaudible] sort of transport lift. It seems to me that the high speed vessel takes care of one of those, but are you concerned about amphibious readiness in terms of the Navy's role?

**Adm. Greenert:** I am concerned and we're turning to on this. Working with the Marine Corps. One of four focus areas I have in '14 is Navy-Marine Corps integration. Jim Amos and I were here about a year ago and talked about that. It remains. The readiness of the amphibious force today, getting those ships under construction, out into the fleet and getting them integrated quickly, and then looking to the future to make sure we have a solid industrial base and an affordable shipbuilding plan that reconstitutes and recapitalizes the amphibious force.

But as Jim Amos and I have testified, the [inaudible] for expeditionary and amphibious ships is huge. It's almost a 50 ship requirement [inaudible] if you're trying to solve it with all the gray hulls, if you will.

So I put up a couple of ships there. You saw the two coming in out of the port -- mobile landing platform, afloat forward staging base. We want to build three of them. Two of them, one under construction, one authorized. Those will augment our amphibious force which will enable us to, where [inaudible] an LSD or an LPD, gray hull ship, in the future we'll use a combination of maybe a joint high speed vessel with some of those. Bringing up the gray hulls so they can concentrate on joint forcible entry and the higher end of warfare aspect. That will get us an amphibious ready group by the end of the decade to support that [inaudible] operation. We need that.

So that is [inaudible] right now. But we've got to keep on it.

**Moderator:** Let me ask you if I could a little bit about partnership capacity. Usually when people say partnership capacity they're thinking the lower end, less hijackings, not military. But I want to start with a key ally [inaudible] in particular.

The NSDI is a great force, as you know very well. Where do you see that going? What kind of capability would you like them to have? Both in terms of what kind of ships and systems they

have, but also [inaudible], the kind of interoperability. You mentioned it briefly which is important, [inaudible] where you'd like to see them go [inaudible].

**Adm. Greenert:** Their capability, what they choose [inaudible]. But I would like to see information sharing and interoperability. We all have seen these slides, the future. You go, what are those lightning bolts? You go, well that's how we share all the information and [inaudible] network. How does that work? I would like to see more of that and we need to work on that.

So for us, the embracement, if you will, or the approval of collective self defense will enable them to integrate into strike group, [inaudible], and where we can actually operate together [inaudible] most aspects of the [vision] including self defense. So that would be a huge step ahead. Imagine, they have got at least four, I believe it is, [inaudible] to the set that we have out there. The issue of North Korea and Northeast Asia. That's [inaudible] information sharing and that interoperability. So if we can get the authorities aligned right, we can really take off.

**Moderator:** I think most people [inaudible] relationship [inaudible]. They see the pictures of our ships side by side in so many exercises. And the announcement last week at the advisory [inaudible] defense was [important]. It specifically mentioned that they want to get rid of this archaic concept that Japan cannot be "integrated [inaudible]" which means sharing information. And noticeably, the lawyers told me [inaudible] turn off everything until we're absolutely certain that this is a purely defensive [action]. It's a very sort of legalistic construct. I don't know if people realize that's actually quite an obstacle. So as you say, it's a force multiplier. For both sides. And important.

[Inaudible]. Where would you like to see the [inaudible] relationship go?

**Adm. Greenert:** Well, Nirvana, there would be a trilateral relationship for ballistic missile defense. Korea has KDX-III which is a destroyer that has an Aegis-like capability. That can track, they've proven it, in our missile range Hawaii, ballistic missiles. They're looking at a weapon to be able to intercept ballistic missiles, so they're working to make that [decision].

They can contribute today because they have very very -- A, they're skilled, and B, they have a great capability. But again, it's a matter of historical issues between Korea and Japan and we're trying to encourage them to see if we can get past that because it's important for the security of today. Both the President and Secretary Hagel are encouraging that.

We look for the opportunities. We had an opportunity, it was earlier in the spring. We did again last fall when we had three ships, one of ours, Japan and Korea. The more we can do [inaudible].

**Moderator:** let me ask you about Southeast Asia and capacity building. The President signed a support agreement in Manila. It was queued up some time ago [inaudible]. I assume we're not opening Subic Bay and sending thousands of sailors on shore leave for the first time in a couple of decades, but what would you like to see us do to build on that [inaudible]? What will the Navy's presence or cooperative efforts look like? Also [inaudible] what's happened in

[inaudible]. [Inaudible] during that South China Sea problem. Is there something that non-allies in terms of capacity building, [inaudible]?

**Adm. Greenert:** We have pretty good, I can speak for the Navy, not for any of the other services, [inaudible] forces. But obviously we refuel and restock in Subic Bay and some other [inaudible] there. And Clark Air Base, we do coordinated, and [inaudible] what I read on that is RP-3 will come in there. The Philippine Armed Forces are on board with us [inaudible] in Guam. So we exercise and interoperate today and our access is reasonably good. How we would want to build up from there I think is a matter of discussion. I think we have to look at status of forces like conversations and so on. I'm sort of waiting to see what it is we can do more of.

We have pretty good access, but hey, if we can step [inaudible], that would be good. I don't know what we want to do with Subic Bay. Again, how big a footprint is [authorized] and understanding that I think would have to be a precursor for bringing in more capability.

With regard to Vietnam and China, they just need to cool off, a cool and deliberate manner and hopefully solve this diplomatically. They're both signators for CUES but this isn't involving Navy ships. Actually [inaudible] Coast Guard [inaudible].

**Moderator:** I think you're going to get your wish on India. [Inaudible] the scenarios, this was the scenario that made the most decisive [inaudible]. I was in the [NSA] in 2005 working on India and we may get back to that. So if [inaudible] picking up, where would you like to see that go? [Inaudible], where would you like to see the U.S.-India naval relationship?

**Adm. Greenert:** We came close to having an Eastern Indian Ocean exercise. Two carriers. Where we would do an operation involving [pylons]. That way we could bring in the amphibious cells [inaudible]. So we had all that planning done. I'd like to move back in that direction.

The Navy, they need to be willing to come over to the Western Pacific. We came close to that. So we'll just have to see where the political, what the ramifications are and where they're willing to go. They are very intelligent; they are very high end in their concept of operations. I think it's just a matter of being able to do the exercises they'd like to do.

**Moderator:** The other one was, you'd know about this, is Russia. [Inaudible] with the Russians on Coast Guard operations and other things as has the Navy. But we're in a tough patch right now. We had General Hawk Carlisle here a couple of weeks ago and he indicated to the audience the OpTempo is way up for the Russian Air Force in the Far East. It's not a threat, but it's a complication I guess. How do you see things on the sea surface side with the Russians in the Far East right now in the context of what's happened?

**Adm. Greenert:** No dramatic changes at this point. I would tell you that they actually increased operations a few years ago. They were willing to do, and have done more exercises. I believe they're on track to do an exercise [inaudible] again every year. They, before all this fuss

with the Ukraine, a year ago my counterpart, Admiral Chirkov, came over and we talked about endeavors we'd like to do. I was going to go to Russia next month. Things have changed.

The bottom line is, he said look, it's about operating money. I would love to come to RIMPAC. That's what we wanted him to do. But I'm kind of short on operating money and I've got three big exercises and that's the third.

My point is, I think it's a matter of budget. And what we call operational availability of their ships. Until they can recapitalize their surface fleet.

**Moderator:** We've gone around the Pacific Rim, a last question about the U.S.. So the Navy rebalance to the Pacific is less than a new thing than it is for other services, but in the service academy, in Annapolis, Naval War College, in educational training opportunities, are you doing anything to sort of upgrade in that area of expertise? Are you finding that people coming out of Annapolis or NOGC or [inaudible] are coming into the Navy knowing this is increasingly now a Pacific force?

**Adm. Greenert:** I find in my conversations this has been in the back of their minds. Anybody that studies our legacy, our heritage, especially the last 100 years, you come to the Western Pacific and see that we're very much Pacific. You study the economy. All of that you say wow, all the action is out there. So I think there's a realization. China obviously attracts a lot of midshipmen so there are a lot more Mandarin speakers, a lot of exchanges, kids want to study overseas, they want to go to China. I understand that. And there's a renewed interest in Southeast Asia, in the Indonesia growth, the Malaysian growth, and what that means. And that interesting culture that is able to have a government, a predominantly Muslim population. How they govern, how do they do that so smoothly as we look to the MidEast and the issues [inaudible].

**Moderator:** Let's open it up to the audience.

**Audience:** Thank you for your important and very impressive talks. My name is Wong Kanling, professor and director of the Center for [inaudible] Affairs in the Law of the Sea, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.

You talked much about Sino-U.S. relations, especially naval relations. I have questions about Sino-U.S. naval relations. You mentioned that the U.S. Navy build constructive relations with China, and you are right about that, but I hope that you can say something more about that, especially how you define the constructive relationships because you mentioned about partnership and strategic partners. So I hope that you can quantify more about constructive relations.

And since we all know that the Chinese Navy developed very fast, and what are its impacts on the U.S. naval strategy? And as we all know there are disputes, maritime disputes in China and its neighboring countries. And what condition and what extent the U.S. will military intervention in the disputes since you have military [credits], defense [credits] with your allies in these regions?

And the last question, it is said that a rebalance has led to escalations of the maritime disputes in East China Sea and South China Sea. What's your take? Thank you.

**Adm. Greenert:** Relationship, what I mean by that is we'll start with two commanding officers. These individuals are in their late 30s and they have a ship that they're ultimately responsible for. And I find the similarities remarkably the same, talking to People's Liberation Army Navy commanding officers and our commanding officers and how they're brought up.

So it is our responsibility to enable these two individuals to be able to cross, if you will, because they're both high end navies, good radars and that. It's inevitable we will cross. There should be a common set of protocols to have a conversation, understand where each other is going and what their operations are to the degree they can do that.

The conversation should not start, you don't belong here, get out of here. No. I'm going to be here, I'm under a treaty. That's just not how mariners in international waters through history have met. And there's an understanding among the Chinese Navy that they are now working to be a great Navy. Great navies are responsible navies and they believe in the security of the high seas.

So it's those protocols, and that's the foundation.

Two, again, China has great capacity for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Peace Ark and a whole host of other capabilities. So they too want to bring relief, if something strikes there they want to be a responsible force. How do we do that effectively as two of the bigger forces there and how do we bring the rest of the navies together if there's a typhoon, a tsunami, a volcano, something like that?

So what organizational construct and what part of the world, who will command, who will be subordinate, in what area? Who will bring the logistics, the medical? What circuits should we talk about? If we all get in the international flow lines, our circuit, then we'll just collaborate and then we'll be able to talk.

So by what means can our junior officers chat? What circuits? Does that make sense to you?

This is a constructive approach that we can agree on. We can start working together and stop arguing right away, and then start building on that. So that's what I mean by constructive.

The way to do that, first, you sit down [inaudible], and say we all agree, right? Then we go to our respective navies and build that up. But then we have to exercise it such as in RIMPAC and others. Then we have to have our junior officers, like I was saying before, grow up and understand that hey, I'm part of a Navy that has to be responsible for this and I have to learn myself how that does. We've got to allow them to get together and describe how they're going to lead us in the future. I'm looking out to 2020 now. It's great that we're having a chat in 2014. I'll be gone then, I will not be in this position, and neither will Admiral Wu. So we've got to figure out how we get beyond that.

Lastly I'd say we've signed treaties and we're responsible, we have to be responsible, reliable members of that treaty. What we don't want is the threat of war, we don't want combat. Nobody does. How do we prevent that? So how do we manage our way through this with the treaties to prevent that sort of a conflict? We definitely don't want it because of some misunderstanding or miscalculation.

**Audience:** My name is Laura Sullivan. I work for [inaudible].

You talked a little bit earlier about fiscal constraints that may be [inaudible] due to budget constraints. So how are [inaudible] cuts [inaudible] which [inaudible] carrier? How is that [inaudible]?

**Adm. Greenert:** The shipbuilding impacts won't affect us in the near term. It takes five years to build a ship, so if there's any that are next year we were going to build a ship and we don't build as many, that impact will be out there. That concerns me and we have to adjust for that. But what you saw up there in the plan for today and where we want to be in 2020, those ships exist today. So the key [inaudible] that we continue apace and put the priority in the Asia Pacific. That's my plan. We will prioritize deployments and [inaudible] in the Asia Pacific, in balance with the rest of the world. You have to balance the rest of the world.

I have to have a ready Navy and I can't send it forward not ready. So I have to make sure that I have a proper balance of that readiness with the force structure that we have today, and the ship building of the future.

My biggest concern would be that we have an industrial base which is not capable of adjusting or adapting to the world of the future. You can't build the number of ships that we need, so we would preclude ourselves for having the sea power that we need in the future.

**Audience:** Do you think about the industrial base of the future as being [inaudible] industrial bases, that we should be thinking about ship building and other systems in terms of what can we build that we -- the Australians, the Japanese, NATO -- [inaudible]? Do you think about this?

**Adm. Greenert:** We do think about it today. So people say okay, ship building, and they're [inaudible], they see ship yards, and all that. There are some elements of ship building -- think of the nuclear carrier builders. How many nuclear submarine builders? But we already share a great deal with the United Kingdom. We are building their [inaudible] compartment. We share that completely. And we have a series of other agreements. But when you're talking about sensors and weapons, we do that today. More than I thought. The more I dig into it. I think we need to continue to broaden [inaudible]. Me and my staff, broaden our vision.

I've rambled on about payloads not platforms. Look for the payloads that exist there today. A weapon system that I can easily integrate in a modular tube like an LCS [inaudible] and follow-on ships that I can put that very lethal, very effective weapons, longer range, tomorrow. And maybe it isn't built here, but we have rules and regulations that we would work through.

**Audience:** Curt Harris from Booz, Allen, Hamilton. I appreciate your remarks.

A couple of real quick questions. Where do you see the FMS programs going to support the rebalance? And what can commercial contractors do to assist you in executing this rebalance?

**Adm. Greenert:** I see FMA and FMS, so foreign military sales and assistance. We need to coordinate. We the military, and Admiral Locklear's working this pretty hard, [they've] put the country teams in the respective navies. I [inaudible] Japan, I mentioned before. I will sit down with Admiral Kawano and say what capability are you building toward? He will ask me questions, remember I was talking about netted sensors? We have a program called Navy Integrated Fire Control Counter-Air, and it's about having our airplane up at the super duper radar, the E2D, the Hawkeye, and he says what do I have that's like that? What kind of com systems do we want to move forward? That has to get over to my international programs people. We sit around and have tea and say all right, we're there. But it's a coordinated effort. That has to get to the country team, to the embassy, as we work toward these common goals.

We've collectively got to do much better at that, and I think that's a real key, or we won't have, we'll have systems not quite compatible and we just can't afford that anymore. There's not enough of all of us to do that.

The ability to do what I just described where contractors could help us, I talk about other sensors, other weapons, other systems that are out there. Where are they? I'd like to know. So come to our Sea Air Space exhibits, come to these and show us what is available. What kind of payloads.

**Audience:** You talk about hardware. What about training?

**Adm. Greenert:** Well, I'm fairly comfortable with the training that exists. It's now bringing it together. It's getting those kids to my war college and their war college. We have a common maritime component commander, it's called a combined -- that means coalition -- maritime component commander, but there could be more of those. So study and give us ideas. I'm [inaudible] for that.

**Audience:** Good morning, sir. Chris [inaudible] here at CSIS. Thank you for your leadership and for being here with us this morning.

A question about the Pacific partnership and all the wonderful good that's done over the last decade, really. But I have two questions regarding that. One is that hospital ships are nearing the end of their service life. And the second question, sort of tying into your earlier comments, how far out do you see before the Peace Ark and the Mercy are working together? You mentioned RIMPAC, perhaps doing something like this in a partnership together. Thank you.

**Adm. Greenert:** We'll see what happens in RIMPAC. WE are going to exchange doctors on that. I don't see how that can be a problem. At least I would hope they stitch like we stitch. So seriously, we need to get by that kind of cultural thing. All of a sudden we say wow, what is their operating room, what is ours? Share, bring them together.

The next step would be we send a detachment to deploy on the Peace Ark and vice versa. Those that actually have to execute that would say yeah, that sounds great Admiral, but --

Listen, I think we've got to work through that.

I think the hospital ship of the future -- put up the afloat forward staging base if you have that. The Mercy is a [inaudible], Mercy and Comfort. This thing costs about \$500 million. If you put a flight deck on it's about \$100 million. So \$600-ish million. Then you see container boxes and all that. So I say a fleet hospital can be put together and implemented on there. The integrated operating rooms and all that on the Mercy are terrific for what they were built for. A Cold War series of casualties moved aboard in a certain way. After Iraq and Afghanistan, I'll tell you, the medical community can do so much on the move that we need to be more modular. So I believe something like that.

We've got time. But when I look at those plans what we can do with it, something like that.

**Audience:** Thank you very much Admiral. My name is [inaudible] with China Daily News Agency. I have two questions for you.

The first one, it was reported by Reuters last week that the United States Navy is negotiating with Vietnam to increase port visits in Vietnam. How is the negotiation going on? Do you consider the location of stationing them?

Second, the U.S. is negotiating with China about the [inaudible] conduct of military operation in the international air and sea. What are the major differences between the two sides at this moment? Thank you very much.

**Adm. Greenert:** I'm not familiar with a specific negotiation for port visits for Vietnam, increase or decrease with the Navy. The Pacific Command may be doing that. I'm just not familiar with that in my headquarters. Sorry I can't speak to that. But I would like to see it increase. [Inaudible] increase exercises accordingly.

The Chief of the Vietnamese Navy was at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, signed up to CUES, and we sat down and had a talk and I look forward to a visit. He invited me to his country. He's going to come to the United States. We'll get started on a common set of features together.

The code of conduct that you mentioned, the only one that I'm familiar with with China and the Chinese Navy that I'm familiar with is this CUES, this Conduct for Unexpected Encounters at Sea. And there are no real [inaudible] yet. WE have to sit down and say all right, where will this apply, what did you train your people to do? Where might it not apply? Does that make sense to you? That's really the focus of effort with us, with the U.S. Navy and the Chinese Navy right now.

**Audience:** Does CUES cover Coast Guard? Because they figured out how to [inaudible] some of these places. The reality is it's more likely to involve Coast guard for --

**Adm. Greenert:** No, and that's a key point. We very much, we've talked to the Chinese Navy about that. We said hey look, your Coast Guard ships, you talk about aggressive. They said you call us, one of our commanding officers, we'll come over and we'll help lead that conversation with our Coast Guard. But separate chain of command. We're working on that, Admiral Wu and his folks. We're working on that but it is a separate chain of command right now so that's an issue.

**Audience:** [Inaudible]. You mentioned [inaudible] Okinawa. [Inaudible], so can you operate [inaudible]?

**Adm. Greenert:** The Tritan deployment as it stands today will be to Okinawa in '17. That is how I understand it right now. You said they [inaudible]?

**Audience:** Guam.

**Adm. Greenert:** I'll tell you what, my public affairs officer will get back with you and we'll get that square. Guam, Okinawa, [inaudible]. Okay?

**Audience:** [Inaudible]. I had a question about RIMPAC and Russia. Will Russia participate in [inaudible] this summer? And what are the future for Russia in [inaudible] if the situation in Ukraine is not solved [inaudible].

**Adm. Greenert:** Russia was invited two years ago at the conclusion of the last RIMPAC. Tentatively said we would like to participate. Then we got a letter saying I'm sorry, we can't come there because I don't have the operating money to send the ships down there. So Admiral Wu and I got together in September and he said do me a favor and ask Admiral Chirkov again. So I did. He said I'm sorry, I still don't have the operating money.

That last interaction was about November or December here they said we will not be participating this year.

I would hope if we can get by the situation we can get back to some mil to mil relationship with Russia. I would hope we can get back to that point. But under the current circumstances, we can't.

**Audience:** The Russians did find the operating budget for their launches, what was supposed to be their launches [inaudible] the Chinese [inaudible] I guess. [Inaudible] RIMPAC sort of Sino-Russian [inaudible], or do you think we need to get --

**Adm. Greenert:** Not yet. It isn't as if we don't operate with the Russians. We have their larger fleet, the Northern Fleet. We have a lot of exercises that are going on between NATO countries, with us, France, Britain, U.S., Russia, [inaudible]. Some acronym. Regrettably, that's on hold now. But I'm satisfied with our interaction generally.

It's always good to get it going in the Pacific, but as long as there's something going on. [Inaudible].

**Audience:** Good morning, I'm Jennifer Chenowitz, [inaudible] Media Group.

My question is, [inaudible] has a contract with General Dynamics [inaudible] to have ten new [inaudible] over the next ten years. And also have planned on buying 86 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles. Would you please talk about the [inaudible] of the submarine and missiles in the Asia Pacific region in the near future? Thank you.

**Adm. Greenert:** The undersea domain is uniquely the Navy's responsibility. All operations undersea. My responsibility is to make sure that today and in the future we have superiority in the undersea domain. We can go wherever we need to go under the sea.

The Virginia Class submarine is a key critical element of that. It's not the only one but it is very much a key to that. So that contract was awarded, that multi-year contract.

**Moderator:** Admiral, thank you. You said earlier that being away from Washington costs a million a day. We probably cost you a couple of hundred thousand this morning. We really appreciate it. I want to thank your staff, they're terrific. And my colleague [inaudible], international security and [inaudible]. You're doing great work, I do appreciate it, and we appreciate you taking the time today. Thank you.

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